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This paper examines the role of the banking system in the German model of
industrial development. It argues that the banks continue to fulfill several of their
traditional functions in industrial finance, despite dramatic changes in financial
regulation and the internationalisation of product and capital markets.  This helps
explain the successful adjustment of German industry since the early 1970s.   The
success of the traditional financial system, however, is at the same time a barrier to
the creation of new high-tech industries - a major competitive challenge for Germany.
Moreover, an emerging dualism in the banking system is evident as large German
firms increasingly seek an Anglo-Saxon style financial market with emphasis on
securities financing, while small and medium size enterprises continue to rely on the
traditional system of long-term bank financing.  In this sense Germany is attempting
to combine  its traditional bank-based finance system with Anglo-Saxon market-
based finance, hoping to achieve the advantages of each system and eliminate the
disadvantages.  Success in this endeavor has been modest.
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Papier wird die Rolle des Bankensystems in Deutschland in dem
deutschen Modell einer industriellen Entwicklung untersucht. Dabei wird die Meinung
vertreten, daß die Banken trotz dramatischer Änderungen in der Regulierung des
Finanzsystems und der Internationalisierung der Finanz- und Gütermärkte immer
noch einige ihrer traditionellen Funktionen in der Unternehmensfinanzierung erfüllen.
Dies erklärt teilweise die seit den frühen siebziger Jahren erfolgreiche Anpassung
der Industrie in Deutschland.
Der Erfolg des traditionellen Finanzsystems ist aber auch gleichzeitig ein Hindernis
bei der Entwicklung und Herausbildung neuer High-Tech-Industrien. Dies bedeutet
für Deutschland eine gewichtige Herausforderung seiner Wettbewerbsfähigkeit.
Darüberhinaus ist ein sich aufbauender Dualismus im Bankensystem immer
deutlicher festzustellen: Große Unternehmen wenden sich immer mehr
angelsächsisch geprägten Finanzmärkten mit ihrer besonderen Orientierung auf
Finanzierungen qua Aktien und Schuldverschreibungen zu, während kleine und
mittlere Unternehmen sich weiterhin auf das traditionelle System langfristiger
Bankenfinanzierung stützen. In dieser Hinsicht wird in Deutschland versucht, das
traditionelle, sich auf Banken stützende Finanzsystem mit dem angelsächsischen
marktgestützten Finanzsystem zu kombinieren in der Hoffnung, die Vorteile beider
Systeme nutzen und ihre Nachteile vermeiden zu können. Der Erfolg in diesen
Bemühungen war allerdings bisher bescheiden.Table of Contents
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1. Introduction
The German financial system has long been viewed as one of the central
ingredients of German industrial success.
1  The common view holds that the
large German banks use a combination of direct share ownership in industry
(enhanced by bank proxy voting of shares held on deposit by banks), bank
representation on company supervisory boards, and high bank debt by
companies to exercise considerable influence in industry.  The advantages of
this system of close bank-firm relations are presumably twofold: First, the
banks, because of their strong position to monitor and influence corporate
management, provide long-term funding or “patient capital” to companies.  This,
in turn, enables the latter to make beneficial long-term investments.  Second,
the banks guide the development of important sectors and are willing to lead
the reorganization of troubled sectors.  This may often mean bank rescues of
failing firms (Zysman 1983). This system is typically seen as a source of
Germany’s comparative industrial advantage because it enables firms to make
long-term commitments and investments in "those intangible assets and
capabilities required for competitiveness - R&D, employee training and skills
development, information systems, organizational development, and supplier
relations" (Porter 1992: 66).  The United States and Britain, because their
financial systems emphasize short-term securities-based corporate finance, are
conversely viewed as comparatively weak at promoting these kinds of
intangible and long-term investments (Porter 1992; Franks and Mayer 1994;
Vitols 1995a).
Over the last ten or so years, the German financial system has been
confronted with three major developments which challenge these traditional
economic functions: These include German reunification, global financial
market integration, and European integration with its accompanying regulatory
changes. German reunification has had surprisingly modest - though not
negligible - effects on the financial system as a whole.  It neither led to
significant changes in financial intermediation patterns in Germany, nor did it
adversely affect bank profitability (Deeg 1994).  Therefore in this paper we
concentrate on analyzing the impact of international and European financial
market integration and regulatory liberalization.
It has been widely posited that financial market integration and regulatory
liberalization are driving a convergence process across financial systems.  The
global trend to securitization or disintermediation is seen to threaten the
                                                          
1  This paper is also forthcoming in the Journal of Industry Studies special edition on Modell
Deutschland in the 1990s.2
traditional functions of the German banks because of the predominance of
bank intermediation in corporate finance in Germany.  This leads to the
question of whether the German financial system is losing its distinctiveness
and along with it the competitive advantages it imparts to German industry.  Will
the short-termism of securities markets replace the long-termism of bank
finance?  Is the German bank-industry model still a viable model in a global
financial marketplace?  This paper argues that banks are still a central
institutional element in the German industrial model.  However, the specific
functions of the banks in promoting German industry differ significantly from
what is commonly understood, and, moreover, have changed substantially over
the postwar period.
Since the early 1970s, the banking system has contributed to successful
industrial adjustment through two of its key traditional functions: The provision
of long-term finance, though mostly to small and medium sized enterprises (the
so-called Mittelstand), and the promotion of stable, long-term shareholdership
in industry.  These two banking system functions contribute directly and
indirectly to long-term investment perspectives in industry through the creation
of a stable financial environment for firms.  This notwithstanding, the best
known and most frequently discussed traditional function of the banks has
changed substantially.  Namely, the power of the banks to promote new
industries or reorganize ailing firms and industries is much more circumscribed
than the traditional view depicts.  Banks intervene less and less frequently into
firm affairs and their ability to coordinate firm collaboration for purposes of
sectoral rationalization has virtually vanished.  Thus, the banking system's
capacity for conducting "private" industrial policy is weakening.  This declining
bank capacity is a reflection of broader changes in the nature of  the typical
relationship between banks and large firms in Germany.  These changes can
be largely explained by the growing financial and managerial autonomy of large
nonfinancial corporations.
In fact, it can be argued that the German financial model is increasingly
becoming two distinct (though intertwined) models: a finance model for the
Mittelstand and a model for large firms.  The Mittelstand model rests on close,
long-term relations between banks and firms in which banks provide not only
long-term finance, but an increasing number of non-financial business services
- notably management consulting - to their clients.  This model corresponds
most closely to the traditional view and is arguably most responsible for
successful adjustment in German industry since the early 1970s.  The large
firm model is based on high levels of self-finance by companies and increasing
use of securities markets (at home and abroad) rather than banks for external
finance.  Large banks have reduced the size of most of their equity stakes in
nonfinancial companies in order to reduce risk exposure and the likelihood of
having to bail-out a client.  These changes in the large firm finance model
began more than twenty years ago, though they have accelerated in recent
years as a result of financial internationalization and the efforts of the German3
financial and industrial community to transform Frankfurt into an international
financial center.  The German large firm finance model is becoming more like
the Anglo-Saxon model, but with at least one critical distinction remaining:
large German firms continue to have stable, long-term shareholdership.  This
insider system of corporate control (Franks and Mayer 1994) is upheld through
concentrated ownership and extensive equity links among large financial and
nonfinancial companies in Germany.
2  As long as this ownership pattern holds,
large German firms should be able to avoid much of the short-termism of
Anglo-Saxon capitalism.
 The fact that the German financial system so far continues to fulfill many
of its most important traditional functions for industry does not mean, however,
that the German model's international competitiveness for the second half of
the 1990s is secured.  On the contrary, the particular strengths of the German
model are maintained with increasing opportunity costs.  For example, the
German focus on stable, long-term relationships between banks and firms is
increasingly, and correctly, seen as inhibiting the formation and growth of firms
in new sectors.  The banking system is therefore one, though not the only,
institutional feature of the German model that accounts for the its relative failure
in spawning new, dynamic industries.  For this reason, and because private
bank-led industrial policy has weakened in general, pressure on the state to
develop and extend public industrial policy has been rising since the 1970s.
Accordingly, the German state has initiated a range of new policies designed to
promote industrial innovation and adjustment.  This is especially apparent in the
growing attempts to create new, high-tech growth sectors such as
biotechnology and microelectronics.  Such policies rarely involve state
dirigisme. Rather, they rely on increased cooperation between the state and
various quasi-public and private organizations, including banks.  Thus the future
success of the German model will likely require even greater public-private
collaboration in the formulation and execution of industrial policy.
The next section of this paper examinations the structure of the German
banking system and the system of long-term finance (LTF) for firms.  The third
section examines the efforts to transform the German financial services
industry since the mid-1980s and its effects on the banking system and
relations to firms.  The fourth section examines the problems which the financial
system presents for firm startups and the development of new industries and
the variety of policy initiatives intended to overcome this deficiency.  The final
section turns to a discussion of the future viability of the German model and
whether the advantages of the German system for long-term industrial finance
can be successfully captured by other nations.
                                                          
2 Ownership in large German corporations is comparatively highly concentrated, with
substantial family ownership in many large firms (Franks and Mayer 1994).4
2. The Banking System and Long-Term Finance
The vast majority of corporate finance by banks is provided by three major
banking groups:  Private national and regional commercial banks (including the
so-called Big Banks - Deutsche, Dresdner and Commerzbank); public savings
banks; and private cooperative banks.  All banks in these groups are universal
banks, i.e., permitted to engage in nearly all financial activities, including
securities and insurance.  In 1994 commercial banks as a group accounted for
29.2% of total business lending; savings banks accounted for 33.7%; and
cooperative banks accounted for 13.2% (Deeg 1995: 157).
Although the large majority of banks in Germany are universal banks, there
are important distinctions among them which shape their respective relations to
firms and their role in industrial development.  The savings bank group or sector
is based on a federal or three-tier associational model.  On the primary level are
624 savings banks (end of 1995).  These banks are legally independent
banking organizations, but are owned and supervised by municipal or county
governments.  They operate in a wide variety of commercial markets and seek
to make (but not necessarily maximize) profits.  As public institutions they are
required to support communal policy initiatives, especially through financing
local infrastructure projects.  In their lending policies these banks are required
to take into consideration the general needs of the local economy.  These
banks are subject to federal and state (Länder) banking regulation, though
primary supervisory responsibility for these banks falls on Länder governments
(each savings banks is chartered under a Länder savings bank law).
The second level of the savings bank group consists of 12 regional savings
bank associations and 13 regional banks known as Landesbanken (or
Girozentrale).  With some exceptions (notably among the five new federal
states), there is one Landesbank for each federal state.  In most cases
ownership of the Landesbank is divided between the Land government and the
regional savings bank association.
3   This division of ownership reflects the fact
that most Landesbanken have multiple functions:  First, they are state banks
which serve their respective Land governments in financial matters.  Second,
they are commercial banks competing directly with banks outside the savings
bank group.  Third, they are "central banks" for local savings banks, providing
internal capital market functions and numerous banking services that these
local banks are not permitted to do, or, cannot do because they lack sufficient
scale-economies.
                                                          
3 In the last few years several of the larger Landesbanken have assumed significant equity
positions in other, smaller Landesbanken.  The Landesbank of Hamburg is owned 100% by
the Land government, while the Landesbanken of Hesse, Saarland and Baden-Württemberg
are owned 100% by the regional savings bank associations.5
The tertiary level of the savings bank sector consists of a national
association and a national central bank (DGZ Bank).  For historical reasons the
DGZ Bank plays a relatively limited role in the savings bank sector.  The
national association, in contrast, plays a major coordinating and policy
leadership role in the group and represents the sector's interests in federal
politics.  In regards to firm finance, savings banks focus on lending to small and
medium-sized enterprises.  The Landesbanken, several of which are among
the largest banks in Germany, focus on wholesale banking, investment banking
and large firm financing.
The cooperative banks also have a three-tier associational structure.  On
the primary level are more than 2,600 (end of 1995) member-owned credit
cooperatives.  As cooperative organizations they are subject to the Federal
Cooperative Law that, among other things, places special requirements and
privileges on them.   On the secondary level are (3) regional cooperative banks
and (6) regional cooperative associations.  On the tertiary level are the national
cooperative banking association and a national bank (DG Bank).  The DG Bank
is one of the ten largest banks in Germany and, along with the national
association, exercises a powerful leadership role within the cooperative banking
sector.  Like the savings banks, cooperative banks focus on Mittelstand lending.
The regional banks and DG Bank focus on wholesale banking activities, large
firm financing, and providing financial services to the small cooperative banks.
Both the savings and cooperative bank groups are characterized by
extensive interorganizational cooperation and a group-internal division of labor
that yields collective benefits for all member banks.
4 Individual savings and
cooperative banks are bound by agreements within their respective
associations to operate only within their local area (regional principle).  This is
intended to prevent competition among banks organized within the same group
and thereby preserve the basis for cooperation within the broader group.  The
regional principle and the strong market share of the association banking
groups also means that competition among banks in Germany is heavily
defined by "group competition."  This means that the savings and cooperative
banks try to compete against other banks, especially the Big Banks, as a group
and not simply as individual banks.
The commercial bank group does not rest on the same extensive
interorganizational cooperation as the savings and cooperative banking groups.
Rather, this group consists of several dozen independently operating national
and regional banks (as well as numerous private banking houses).  Nationally
operating commercial banks have traditionally focused on large firm financing,
both in the form of loans and equity capital.  Since the early 1970s, however,
                                                          
4 Membership in the associations is formally voluntary, though there are powerful market and
regulatory incentives that ensure membership - especially in the case of savings and co-
operative banks.6
virtually all commercial banks have aggressively pursued Mittelstand finance as
well.  The largest of these banks, especially the Big Banks, also have significant
shareholdings in non-financial firms and place their representatives on the
supervisory boards of many of the largest corporations.  Through bank equity
holdings and board representation, large commercial banks play a significant
(but not dominant) role in the network of interlocking directorates and cross-
shareholdings that characterize relations among large German firms (a few of
the Landesbanken are also part of this system: see Gottschalk 1988; Baums
and Fraune 1995; Franks and Mayer 1994).
Special credit banks represent a fourth category of financial institutions with
a significant role in industrial finance.  This category consists of mortgage
banks (public and private), public or quasi-public long-term credit banks, and
the postal bank.  In 1994, these banks accounted for 14.2% of total business
lending.  For long-term industrial finance, the most important banks are the
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), the Deutsche Ausgleichsbank (DtA), and
the Industriekreditbank (IKB).  All of the German states also operate special
credit banks that provide loans and grants to regional firms.
2.1. A System of Long-Term Financing
It can be easily argued that the single most important contribution of the
banking system to German industrial success in the postwar period is the
provision of long-term finance.  Long-term finance (LTF) facilitates long-term
investment in R&D, labor force skill development, and collaboration with other
firms (Soskice 1995; Vitols 1994; Deeg 1995; Franks and Mayer 1994).  The
provision of LTF by the banking system was a central ingredient in the
successful extension of diversified quality production during the 1970s and
1980s in German industry.
5  Moreover, during the turbulent 1970s it was the
savings and cooperative banking groups - the two groups most committed to
the Mittelstand and local economic success that were most aggressive in
financing business, especially industry: Reflecting this fact, from 1972 to 1982
the market share of the Big Three in loans to manufacturing industry declined
from 28.2% to 18.2%; in the same period the market shares of the savings and
cooperative bank groups rose from 26.1% to 33.2% and 11.3% to 17.5%,
respectively (Deeg 1995: 157).  Thus, successful industrial adjustment in this
period is attributable to a significant degree to the existence and
responsiveness of the savings and cooperative banking groups.
                                                          
5 Diversified Quality Production focuses on the production of high quality, often customizable,
products through the use of sophisticated production technologies and highly skilled labor.7
Though Germany has a long tradition of industrial finance, long-term
lending by banks only came to constitute a substantial portion of their business
loan portfolio during the postwar period (the savings banks are an exception to
this).  From 1950 to 1993, the ratio of long-term bank loans (maturity of four
years or more) to all bank loans to nonfinancial firms rose from 45% to 77%
(Vitols 1994: 28).  This high level of LTF, however, can only be explained by
examining the interactive effects of several institutional mechanisms that make
the provision of LTF rational market behavior for banks:  The postwar German
financial regulatory framework encourages LTF through, among other things,
strict maturity matching requirements which help control the interest rate risk
associated with long term loans (i.e. they are financed significantly through
long-term, fixed interest deposits).  The association structure of the savings and
cooperative banks facilitates LTF because the internal capital market functions
of their regional and national banks enables the transformation of short-term
deposits into long-term loans (Vitols 1995a: 21).  While interest rates are
deregulated, several mechanisms are in place to stabilize interest rates,
including the (quasi-public) Central Capital Market Committee which
coordinates new securities issues.  Last, but hardly least, long-term interest rate
stability has been promoted by the consistently low and stable inflation rate
secured through tight Bundesbank monetary policy.
To enable banks to increase LTF, the state also promoted bank access to
long-term savings through three mechanisms: the creation of long term credit
banks which provide universal banks with long-term loan refinancing; through
long-term savings incentives provided to individuals; and by permitting banks to
issue long-term bank bonds (much of which is sold to insurance companies;
Vitols 1995a).  Finally, growing competition among the three major banking
groups, especially for Mittelstand business, provided further incentives for
banks to provide the LTF firms demanded.  As part of their strategy, banks
have increasingly supplemented LTF with increased provision of
complementary services to firms, primarily in the form of extended financial and
investment planning and general business consulting (Deeg 1995).
This system of long-term financing for Mittelstand firms has been
successfully maintained, even extended, during the 1990s.  It was also
extended successfully to eastern Germany and it has played a crucial role in
restructuring the regional economy (Deeg 1994).  It is essential to note,
however, that the public long term credit institutes, most importantly the KfW,
DtA, and IKB, are playing an ever more important role in the maintenance of
the LTF system.  While these banks have been operating several programs for
the Mittelstand since the early postwar years, their lending to the Mittelstand
expanded dramatically during the 1970s when many of these firms faced
severe adjustment pressures.
6  The KfW, the largest special credit bank,
                                                          
6 In 1970 the KfW granted a total of DM 838 million in domestic loans; in 1986 the KfW granted
a total of DM 9.8 billion in domestic loans, DM 6.2 billion of which went to the Mittelstand.  In8
estimates its market penetration in Mittelstand finance to be quite high:  Of
manufacturing firms with annual revenues less than DM 5 million in 1985, the
KfW financed 45% of their total investment; for firms with revenues between
DM 5 million and DM 100 million the share of the KfW in total investment
ranged between 20% and 25%.
7  Vitols estimates that the seventeen special
credit institutes in Germany currently account for just over one quarter of all
long-term loans to manufacturing (Vitols 1994: 13).
8
Indeed, over the last two decades the successful adaptation and extension
of the Mittelstand finance model has relied increasingly on collaboration
between governments and their public special credit banks and universal
banks.  This reflects the expanding industrial policy efforts of the federal and
Länder governments which are based heavily on the provision of financial
incentives to firms.  This occurs in good measure through tax credits, but also
substantially through low-interest loans granted for specific kinds of firm
investment.  Such loans (and many grants) are normally distributed through
what is known as the Hausbankverfahren (or house bank procedure).  Under
this procedure, firms apply to their house bank for a government loan - whether
for a startup, a technology project, expansion or modernization investment.
The bank then evaluates the applicant according to normal credit criteria, since
the bank generally carries the full credit risk of the loan.  If the bank approves
and the application meets program guidelines, the application is forwarded to
the government bank (in some cases this is still done by government
ministries). Loan officers from the government bank then seek an official
opinion (Gutachten) on the application from the appropriate craft or industry
chamber, or, in the case of technology-oriented loans, from an officially
recognised technical expert.  These opinions are intended to assess the
technical or market viability of the planned investment.  When all approvals are
given, the house bank dispenses a loan on terms set by the government
program and refinances this loan with a government bank.  Such loans are
normally long-term at fixed interest rates.  Thus interest rate risk is carried by
the government bank.
The house bank procedure offers the state, banks and firms several
advantages:  for the state it economizes on information gathering (credit risk
assessment and loan monitoring) and loan administration costs; for banks it
provides low cost long-term refinancing and improves the financial stability of its
                                                                                                                                                                         
1991, loans for domestic investment peaked at nearly DM 32 billion (more than half went to
the eastern Länder);  DM 17.7 billion went to Mittelstand firms.  In 1973 the DAB granted DM
33 million in loans for business start-ups, by 1983 such loans amounted to just over DM 1.4
billion. See the 1987 and 1993 Annual Reports of the KfW; and the 1983 and 1987 reports of
the DtA.
7 Götte, Gerhard. 1988. "Anmerkungen zur Effektivität von Investitionsförderungsprogrammen
am Beispiel des KfWs." Der Langfristige Kredit. 21/22:700-703. This only includes
manufacturing firms with more than 20 employees.
8 This percentage would be even higher if the loans of all Länder development banks (in both
the East and West) were fully accounted.9
firm clients; for banks and firms it ensures that market criteria play the dominant
role in allocating government credit since the bank normally carries the credit
risk of the loan.  The comprehensiveness and long-term nature of government
loans also promote long-term collaborative relations between the state and
banks, and between banks and their firm clients.
The extensive utilization of the house bank procedure is also favored by the
state and market actors because it is held to minimize state dirgisme, i.e., to
preserve the liberalism in state policy.  While this may be true when compared
to the kind of credit allocation practices long common in Japan or France,
extensive German state lending is not without significant allocational effects.
Loan programs are targeted to promote particular kinds of firm investment -
startups, firm (technical) modernization, and technology projects are the major
categories.  The amount of funds made available for different kinds of
investment has shifted over time in accordance with changing industrial policy
objectives.  For example, during the 1980s many Länder long-term credit banks
shifted lending from startups to technology loans.  It is very difficult to measure
the extent to which firm investment patterns shifted in response to changes in
government financial incentives, but it is equally difficult to believe that
government incentives could have no effect.  This is especially evident in
eastern Germany, where massive government loans are all that is preventing
the collapse of eastern industry.  Thus, the state does influence credit allocation
in the economy through the banking system.  In contrast to other countries,
however, the policy priorities embodied in these allocational objectives are
generally determined through decision-making bodies involving representatives
from government, industry, and the financial community and not the state acting
over and above the private sector.
9
In summary, the German system for long-term finance is a public-private
system that rests on a complex of regulatory, legal, and institutional patterns.
Consistent with the common view of the German economy, banks remain the
most important financial intermediary for the nonfinancial sector.  Some 60% of
the financial liabilities of the nonfinancial sector consists of bank loans; stocks
account for roughly 5% of liabilities and bonds for 13% (Vitols 1994).  Thus,
despite concerted efforts over the last decade to develop equity market finance
in Germany - which we discuss next - firms continue to rely heavily on banks for
their external finance.  But this is mostly the case for the Mittelstand.  Large
firms, in contrast, are increasingly de-coupled from lending by the domestic
banking system: From 1978 to 1989 the bank debts of large nonfinancial firms
declined from 13.7% to 7.6% of balance sheet liabilities.
10  Large firms are
increasingly borrowing directly from capital markets and foreign financial
institutions.  But borrowing by large firms is, on the whole, relatively limited
                                                          
9 For example, the oversight boards of the KfW, DtA, and IKB - which help determine bank
policy - have representatives from all of these sectors.
10 "Longer-term trends in the financing patterns of west German enterprises," Monthly Report of
the Deutsche Bundesbank, vol. 4, October 1992, p. 30.10
since large German firms typically have extensive reserves (notably pensions)
which they use to finance both current and long-term investment.  Thus the
system of bank-based LTF in Germany remains vital for successful adjustment
by Mittelstand firms.  Meanwhile, large German firms are developing a more
securitized and internationalized system of finance.
3.   Internationalization and Strategic Changes in Banking
It is widely understood that financial sectors have experienced sweeping,
indeed revolutionary, changes in the last two decades.  Briefly and generally
stated, national financial sectors in all advanced industrial countries have been
extensively liberalized and rapidly integrated with each other, thereby creating
an increasingly global financial system (see, for example O'Brien 1992).  In this
section we highlight the major changes within the German financial services
sector which have direct and significant consequences for the organization of
the financial services sector and banks' role in industry.
Compared to most other national banking industries, the German banking
system has long been lightly regulated.  Universal banking has dominated the
system since the early 20th century.  Government interest rate regulation was
abandoned in the late 1960s (though a certain amount of informal coordination
among banks has continued to occur, especially in regard to deposit rates;
Quack and Hildebrandt 1995).  What has always been, and remains, relatively
strict is prudential regulation.   However, this presents relatively little problem for
German banks, since European and international prudential standards are
moving, in a broad sense, closer to the German position.  For example, the
widespread adoption of the Basle Committee capital adequacy standards
marked the introduction of clear, numeric bank capital standards in many
counties - something long-practiced in Germany.  Moreover, European Union
financial regulation is generally supportive of the universal banking model, and
thus represents no major threat to the general German approach to banking.
Consequently, banking regulation and the organization of the banking industry
have remained comparatively stable in Germany.  Germany has not seen
anything like the kind of mergers, acquisitions or failures of financial institutions
that have marked the UK and US financial systems in the era of liberalization.
Rather, in Germany the real action has taken place in the area of securities
markets and their regulation.
11
                                                          
11 Because of universal banking and bank dominance in securities markets, changes in
securities markets and their regulation invariably involves changes in bank regulation.
However, in this paper we make an analytical distinction because most of the market and
regulatory change in Germany is intended to address securities markets issues rather than
traditional commercial banking activities.11
As the world has moved toward more liberal financial market regulation,
integration of national financial markets, and a general trend to securitization
(disintermediation), the German financial sectors greatest comparative
weakness - the relative underdevelopment of securities markets - has become
increasingly conspicuous.  Weak securities markets have come to be viewed by
international investors, and eventually the German financial community itself, as
a major problem for the international competitiveness of banks and Frankfurt as
an international financial center, as well as the ability of German firms to raise
capital efficiently and cheaply (Lütz 1996).  Consequently, there has been
significant regulatory liberalization in Germany since the mid-1980s intended to
stimulate the development of securities and money markets in Germany.
Starting in 1985, several liberalization measures were adopted to permit
the introduction of new financial products such as zero-coupon and floating-rate
notes, and interest and currency swaps in deutschmark. To facilitate the
introduction of more firms to the stock market, the Free Market was opened in
1987 for trading in unlisted shares.  In 1989 the Stock Exchange Law was
amended to permit trading in options and futures contracts.  In 1990 the
German Options and Futures Exchange was opened (Deutscher Terminbörse,
DTB).  In 1990 the First Financial Market Promotion Law was promulgated.
Among other measures, the law eliminated many of the taxes that hindered
securities trading and enabled German investment funds to trade in derivatives.
This law, coupled with the Bundesbank's suspension of its approval
requirements for debt issuance, enabled the creation of a deutschmark
commercial paper (CP) market at the beginning of 1991.  After years of
opposition, the Bundesbank finally permitted the introduction of money market
funds in 1994, thus helping to create demand for short-term commercial paper.
To facilitate cheaper and faster trading of Germany's leading stocks, an
electronic exchange system (IBIS) was created in early 1991.  While Frankfurt
dominates German securities trading, market trading was long hindered by a
fragmented exchange system built upon eight regional exchanges.  The major
German banks and federal government sought to unify regional exchanges for
many years, but faced stiff resistance from Länder authorities who feared a loss
of jobs and financial clout.  In 1992 the German Exchange Company (Deutsche
Börse AG) was finally established to control the Frankfurt exchange and link the
regional exchanges.
These efforts to develop securities markets and promote Frankfurt as a
global financial center have been recently promoted within Germany as the
Finanzplatz Deutschland campaign.  Finanzplatz Deutschland represents the
cumulative efforts to liberalize German equity markets, to harmonize financial
regulations with the EU, and to institutionalize new financial market regulation
by codifying and elaborating rules, establishing legal controls and extending
formal state regulation (Moran 1992).  The Finanzplatz Deutschland campaign
took a large step forward with the omnibus Second Financial Market Promotion12
Law promulgated in mid-1994.  The law significantly harmonized the content
and form of German regulation with international norms.  Probably of greatest
significance was the creation of  a new, independent securities supervisory
office was established (Bundesaufsichtsamt für den Wertpapierhandel, BAWe)
to oversee the transformation of German securities markets. The new
watchdog agency will assume much of the self-regulation traditionally exercised
by the financial community.  The institutionalization of such authority in an
independent public body is essential to establish the international credibility of
capital markets regulation in Germany.  One of the key functions of the agency
will be to enforce a new legal ban on insider trading, a measure widely seen as
necessary to win the confidence of international investors and to comply with
EU banking directives.  Strengthened information reporting rules will also be put
in place, including the requirement that all stakes of 5% or more, and
shareholdings moving over or under the 10%, 25%, 50% and 75% thresholds,
must be publicly announced and registered with the new agency.
12  S u c h
stringent information requirements represents a dramatic break with the past.
German firms and banks are hardly accustomed to extensive public knowledge
of their dealings.  Even so, more stringent information reporting requirements,
as well as further amendments made to the stock exchange law, are seen as
necessary to promote the objective of greater market transparency and thereby
attract more international investors (Lütz 1996).
All of these regulatory changes facilitated the further opening and
deepening of German capital markets: From 1982 to 1990, equity market
capitalization grew from DM 170 billion to DM 510 billion and trading volume
grew from DM 40 billion to nearly DM 500 billion.
13  There is also a growing
readiness on the part of medium-sized firms to go public.  In the ten years from
1977 to 1986 there were 85 initial public offerings; in the six years from 1987 to
1992 there were 111 (Schuber, 1993).  It is widely expected in that the going
public trend will continue since thousands of mid-size companies suffer from a
deteriorating equity position and face a succession crisis from company founder
to non-familial management.
14
                                                          
12 Financial institutions will be required to inform the BAWe of all securities and derivative
trading for their own and other accounts. All firms that have issued publicly traded securities
must immediately and publicly disclose all information relevant to the value of their securities.
It remains to be seen what the new `information culture' in Germany will consider relevant - a
change that will be importantly shaped by how the new BAWe defines in practice what is
`relevant' information. "Die neue Publizitätspflicht verunsichert Aktiengesellschaften,"
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 June 1994. "Bei Insider-Handel künftig fünf Jahre
Gefängis," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18 June 1994. "Bei Insiderverstössen droht
künftig fünfjährige Haft," Handelsblatt, 13 July 1993.
13 'The 1992 Guide to European Equity Markets', Euromoney, January 1992 (supplement).
14 In fact, some 700,000 Mittelstand firms in western Germany will be seeking new
managers/owners in the next decade as the postwar entrepreneurial generation retires.
`Westdeutscher Mittelstand: Gründer-Generation tritt ab', IWD: Informationsdienst des
Instituts der deutschen Wirtschaft 15, 8.13
3.1. Effects on Bank Organization and Strategy
Regulatory changes and growing domestic and international bank competition
have had a direct impact on the organization and market strategies of German
banks.  Despite their long history as universal banks engaged in a wide range
of financial services, during the 1980s all the major German banks and banking
groups extended their Allfinanz (bancassurance) strategies by expanding into
new services such as management consulting and, most notably, insurance.  In
other words, the Big Banks and the savings and cooperative banking groups
are extending a strategy of financial conglomeration.  This strategy is heavily
driven by the group nature of bank competition, in which each big bank or
banking group tries to match the others service for service.
Most importantly, the German banks realized that to be competitive in both
domestic and international markets they must have much better developed
investment banking capacities.  The strategic push to develop investment
banking is a response to five major market developments: first, the global and
increasingly German pattern of securitizing debt demands stronger
underwriting, trading and investment management capacities; second, global
economic integration requires more and more interest and currency risk
management; third, firms are demanding more financial consulting; fourth, new
forms of equity finance are emerging and corporate restructuring through
mergers and acquisitions, spin-offs, management-buy-outs and buy-ins is
growing; and fifth, more sophisticated project-specific investments, especially
for large-scale undertakings, is being sought by large firms (Reimpell 1990:
488-490).
Some German banks are seeking to be `global players.'  To this end the
Deutsche Bank bought a leading British investment bank - Morgan Grenfell - in
1989.  Likewise, the WestLB took over the European operations of another
British bank - Standard Charter - in 1990.  During 1995 several large German
banks went on a much-publicized shopping spree, buying investment banks
and bankers in London and New York.  For example, the Dresdner bought the
British investment bank Kleinwort Benson in 1995.  Other German banks are
seeking to be `niche' players in the domestic or European markets.  But
whether global or niche player, investment banking has become a major
strategic focus for all three major banking groups and they are modernizing
their technological capacities, reorganizing departments internally, and
retraining their personnel who are more accustomed to the traditional domestic
credit business.
This new environment is clearly more favorable to initial public offerings
and equity issues by dynamic young firms in Germany.  It is also more
favorable to corporate restructuring through mergers, acquisitions, and sell-offs.
In short, the German "market for firms" is becoming more dynamic and more
like Anglo-Saxon capitalism.  In principle, a more dynamic firm sector should14
raise the possibility for new high-tech firms and sectors to emerge, since
resources (capital and human) would more frequently become available for new
entrepreneurial undertakings.  However, German equity markets remain
comparatively underdeveloped and IPOs, while increasing, are still relatively
few in number:  During 1995, there were 20 IPOs in Germany, bringing the total
of listed firms to 678 with a market capitalization of ECU 438.6 billion; by
comparison, there were 184 IPOs in the UK, and total listed firms were 1,745
with a market capitalization of ECU 1,038.3 billion.
15
Growing bank competition and market integration are also straining the
organizational capacities of the savings and cooperative banking groups.  The
chief problem both these association banking groups face is how to maintain an
effective division of labor and cooperation among banks within the group.  This
problem arises primarily out of the desire by larger banks within each
association to have greater market autonomy, which, among other things, tends
to create competition among banks organized within the same banking
association. Thus, over the last decade both the savings and cooperative
banking groups have struggled with internal coordination problems.  These
have been most severe for the savings banks (Deeg 1995).  Resolving such
problems is essential to the long-term competitiveness of each of these bank
groups, especially for the smaller banks within each group that are more
dependent on the broader association for their own individual competitiveness.
Maintaining effective group-internal cooperation is all the more important
because of the group nature of competition among banks in Germany.  If
cooperation were to erode or dissolve within one group, the banks organized
within it would be exposed to individual bank competition without the support of
the broader group. An erosion of groups would have a far-reaching impact on
bank-industry relations and Germany's system of long-term finance (LTF).
Competitive pressure on the two association banking groups is also
reflected in the fusion of smaller savings and especially cooperative banks with
other banks organized in the same group.  This concentration may reduce the
supply of services and LTF to Mittelstand firms in some areas.  On the other
hand, it may strengthen the capacity of remaining savings and cooperative
banks to provide Mittelstand firms with the growing number of services they
need to remain competitive.  Moreover, concentration in Germany is occurring
at a comparatively slow pace and is largely controlled by the associations.  One
of the implications of this relatively stable structure of the banking industry is
that it continues to focus on Mittelstand firm clients as a key customer group.
This means that the German system of LTF for the Mittelstand - and all the
banking and public sector institutions which compose it - remains largely intact
and is adjusting successfully to financial liberalization and market integration
processes.  Despite all the efforts to build up securities markets, German
                                                          
15 ”Banken 1996: Fakten, Meinungen, Perspektiven", Bundesverband deutscher Banken,
Cologne, 1996.p. 68.15
Mittelstand firms continue to prefer bank finance and maintaining close
relations with their bankers.
In contrast, the reform of the German securities sector and the growing
focus of banks on investment banking has accelerated the longer-term trends in
bank-large firm relations in Germany.  Large firms are exploiting the growing
opportunities for domestic and international finance.  These broad changes in
industry and bank strategy also mean that big equity stakes in large firms are
becoming less attractive to large banks (Deeg 1995; Sabel, Griffin, Deeg
forthcoming).  Banks are increasingly cautious about being caught in a situation
where they must bail-out a firm client.  Their investment strategies are shifting
to a diversification logic as a means of reducing portfolio risk.  Accordingly, the
major banks have sold or significantly reduced many of their largest equity
holdings in non-financial firms.  This does not mean, however, that large
German firms no longer have an environment supportive of long-term
investment.  On the contrary, large German firms are maintaining (if not actually
increasing) their cross-shareholdings and interlocking directorates.
One of the presumed advantages of the German financial model is that
banks are more willing to aid financially troubled firms or sectors (or to promote
particular industries) through the assumption of firm equity, cancellation or
restructuring of debts, extension of new credits (often with government
guarantees), or even temporary bank involvement in decision-making.  The
change in bank equity investment strategies, however, also means that the
trend away from bank-led corporate (and sectoral) restructuring will continue.
The growing hesitation of banks to act as coordinators of private industrial
policy is most harshly evident in eastern Germany where the banks have
invested surprisingly little equity in firms.  Several Landesbanken continue to
engage in this kind of intervention, but for them direct large firm intervention is
clearly made possible largely because of their public status and the financial
backing of Land governments.
In summary, all the regulatory and market changes associated with the
development of securities markets (and incorporate EU regulation) have not
significantly altered the core institutions or functions of the Mittelstand finance
model.  The effects on the large firm finance model have been much more
significant, but only in a manner that accelerated trends already underway.
4.  Promoting New Industries: Challenge of the 1990s
One of the keys to successful industrial adjustment in Germany is LTF and
long-term relations between banks and firms.  Long-term investment horizons in
industry are further promoted by the high concentration of ownership in large16
German firms which promotes stability in ownership (and inhibits unwanted
takeovers).  State industrial policy, notably long-term lending by special credit
banks, reinforces this system of long-term relations and financial stability.  But
are these successful institutions and policies of the 1970s and 1980s sufficient
to meet the adjustment challenges of the 1990s?
Since the 1970s, the German federal and Länder governments have grown
increasingly concerned with promoting innovative new companies and new
growth industries, especially in biotechnology and microelectronics-related
technologies.  Indeed, for more than a decade German policymakers have
come to see their lack of success in cutting-edge, high-tech sectors as one of
the greatest threats to national economic competitiveness.  While the German
financial system and state industrial policy have been relatively successful in
promoting startups and firm modernization in established sectors, they have not
been especially successful in promoting firms in new sectors.  Many have
blamed the banks' high risk adversity for this problem (for example, Audretsch
1995). Is this, in fact, the major obstacle to the growth of new high-tech
sectors?
To be sure, there are a number of institutional features of the German
financial system which bias it against new firms in new sectors.  First, only in
the last twenty years have the major commercial banks begun to systematically
court business with Mittelstand firms.  Thus the banks which should have the
strongest capacities to evaluate and promote riskier high-tech ventures have
only recently begun to do so.  Even so, the major banks are generally not
strongly interested in financing startups.  They prefer to focus on established
Mittelstand firms with at least DM 5 million turnover (Deeg 1995).  All of the
three major banking groups have established equity participation and venture
capital funds, but these funds invest largely in promoting the expansion of
already firmly established companies in traditional, rather than new growth
sectors.  Second, strict prudential regulation and other institutional incentives
lead banks to require high collateral for loans - something more easily satisfied
by existing rather than startup firms (Quack and Hildebrandt 1995).  Third,
savings and cooperative banks are not permitted to own equity in nonfinancial
firms.  Only their regional/national banks or venture funds may do this.  Thus
the many smaller banks that are likely to have more intimate knowledge of new
entrepreneurs cannot support them with risk-based capital.  Fourth, the major
banking groups are placing emphasis on building other capacities:  The savings
and cooperative banking groups are eager to build up their securities trading
capacities; the major commercial banks are investing heavily in their overseas
presence and in the expansion of investment banking services for larger firms.
Finally, equity market finance for new companies remains comparatively
lethargic.  This is attributable to many factors, including the dearth of
institutional investors willing to assume higher risk in exchange for higher
returns.  In short, the very strengths of the German model in promoting
established firms are at the same time barriers to new, high-tech firms.17
To be fair, there are also numerous nonfinancial barriers to the
establishment of nontraditional firms and sectors.  First, labor market
institutions and cultural factors mitigate labor mobility and the emergence of a
larger class of entrepreneurs willing to forego employment stability in the pursuit
of their own businesses (Soskice 1995).  Second, only in the last decade or so
has the state promoted the more intensive university-industry research
cooperation that in other countries, notably the US, has often spawned new
firms and industries.  Various studies have shown that spillovers from university
research are more important for smaller firms than large (Acs, Audretsch,
Feldman 1992).  Third, successful innovation in Germany is largely incremental
and accomplished by firms "embedded" in a rich institutional network: training
institutions, interfirm collaboration, trade-association or sector-based
collaborative R&D, and sector-based information dissemination mechanisms
(Soskice 1995; Kitschelt 1991).  These innovation-promoting institutions are
heavily defined along sectoral boundaries (in good part because of strong trade
associations and industrial unions) and thus not easily turned to new sectors.
New sectors have a hard time getting established without being able to fully
utilize the resources of these established institutions, since participation in them
is often the portal to other resources, including state funds.  Finally,
entrepreneurship in high-risk technologies is discouraged by legal barriers such
as the bankruptcy law which prohibits an entrepreneur from establishing a third
firm if the first two ended in bankruptcies (Audretsch 1995).
In recognition of this problem, the state has adopted several measures to
promote investment in new firms in general, and in high-tech firms in particular.
For example, since the early 1980s, the state and financial community have
adopted several regulatory changes intended to promote going public among
smaller firms.  While there was a significant increase in IPOs during the 1980s,
equity finance remains relatively circumscribed in Germany, especially for
Mittelstand finance.  Since most SMEs in Germany are still reluctant to go
public, banks and public authorities have sought to produce a functional
equivalent through an alternative form of limited equity finance.  This form of
finance has grown dramatically since the early 1980s, as the banking industry
was encouraged through regulatory and legal measures by the federal and
state governments to expand funding for new and existing capital participation
corporations (Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften, KBGs).  All of the three major
banking groups operate KBGs.  In each German state there also exists a state-
supported, non-profit KBG (also supported by the major banking groups and
local business associations).
KBG equity investments are made for a fixed period of typically five to ten
years, receive an annual (in some cases profit-dependent) dividend, and
generally do not involve a management role for the KBG.  Some KBGs,
however, function more like venture capital funds, investing in technology-
oriented projects and realizing much of their profit only after ending their
participation.  These KBGs are more frequently involved in assisting firm18
management where they have invested.  Firms use KBGs for a variety of
purposes such as seed money, expansion finance, facilitating management-
buy-outs, or leveraging additional bank loans.
16  From 1980 to 1989 the total
number of equity participations in SMEs grew from 910 to 1,701, and total
invested capital rose from DM 620 to DM 2,500 million:
17  At the end of 1993,
KBGs held DM 5,400 million of equity in over 2,700 SMEs.
18
To minimize the risks associated with investing in new and smaller firms,
SMEs and their banks draw on several assistance mechanisms that involve
close cooperation and risk-sharing between banks and government or
government-supported institutions.  First, in each German state there is a
publicly supported loan guarantee bank and KBG.
19  Firms turn regularly to
these organizations for equity injections or loan guarantees when their house
bank(s) alone can no longer sustain them.  In many cases, state governments
also provide loan guarantees directly to firms.  Many state development banks
provide liquidity assistance through long-term loans to financially distressed
SMEs.  Such loans are usually provided when the firm's banks cannot provide
sufficient liquidity to keep an otherwise competitive firm afloat.  In the state of
Baden-Württemberg, for example, several hundred SMEs received such
liquidity loans during 1993 when the regional economy was in a severe
recession. In the vast majority of cases state aid (regardless of form) is
contingent upon continued bank participation in the firm's credit risk, thus
reducing the likelihood that non-competitive firms will be sustained through
state subsidies.  Through these public-private finance mechanisms, banks and
government increasingly share the risk of the riskiest SME investments such as
start-ups and product innovation.  They help viable SMEs survive through short-
term downturns in demand or financial bottlenecks.
While all of these efforts have had considerable success in aiding existing
firms or startups in established sectors, their success in promoting new high-
                                                          
16 Fromman, Holger. "Die Rolle der Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften in der
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kräftig aufgestockt," Handelsblatt, 2/3 June 1989.
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"Kapitalbeteiligungen in den neuen Bundesländern." IFO Schnelldienst 48(13), 11-19.
19 Public loan guarantee cooperatives and equity participation companies are actually public-
private organizations, receiving public and private funding and overseen by boards consisting
of government, business, and bank sector representatives.19
tech firms/sectors is more doubtful.  German equity participation funds, for
example, have invested 14% of their capital in machinery companies, and only
a combined 8.8% in biotech, telecommmunications and computer firms: In the
US, by contrast, 38% of venture capital funds are invested in these last three
sectors.
20  Government grants and loans for startups are widely dispersed and
are generally not targeted on startups in specific sectors.  The house bank
procedure, with its reliance on expert opinions from chambers, likely reinforces
investment in existing sectors, because the chambers are familiar with them.
Indeed, the large majority of government startup loans goes to craft and service
firms in traditional sectors.  New firm startups based on more radical
innovations, while increasingly enjoying state support, are still few in number.
Even where such firms are viewed favorably by government agencies and
banks, the frequently very long approval time for government technology
loans/grants means that only firms which receive advanced loans from banks
have a chance to survive.  The growing number of equity participation/venture
capital funds also tend to benefit existing firms with steady revenues and cash
flow, since these funds typically expect annual dividends.  The number of funds
willing to invest in more radically innovative companies and wait several years
for a pay-off is relatively limited.
Despite the shortcomings of the financial system in promoting new high-
tech firm startups, it would surely be misleading to suggest that this is the
primary barrier to high-tech startups.  For just as the success of the German
model is due not to one institution, but to the system created by a range of
institutions, so too are the failures of the model.  Simply raising the supply of
true venture capital does not mean there would be commensurate demand.
Thus, achieving the goal of new growth sectors requires broader institutional
and policy changes; changes which ultimately may be incompatible with
sustaining the traditional strengths of the German financial model.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion, we turn to the question of the future viability of the German
model of industrial finance.  As always, the further one tries to predict into the
future, the greater the likely inaccuracy of any forecast.  Nonetheless, the
contours of change in the German system are clearly evident and may, within
reason, be extrapolated into the near future.  Perhaps the most significant
contour of change is an emerging dualism in the industrial finance model
between a Mittelstand finance model and a large firm finance model.  The
Mittelstand model resembles most closely the traditional model of close house
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bank relations between bank and firm and heavy bank financing of firm
investment.  Through group competition and Allfinanz banks have sought to
deepen their relations to Mittelstand firms by providing them not only with
financing (both in the form of loans and increasingly in the form of limited equity
participations), but with an ever-wider range of financial and business services.
It is essential to note that this kind of bank behavior rests on specific
institutional incentives which are themselves heavily shaped by state policies.
Thus the importance of state policy in preserving Germany's system of
industrial finance should not be underestimated.  As regulatory harmonization
and market competition in financial services grow, especially within the
European Union, the future of Germany's financial model will ride on the ability
of the state to maintain the institutional incentives which undergird it.  Indeed,
the state, at both the federal and Länder level, has worked hard to maintain and
adapt this system to changes in broader structural market conditions.  In sum,
the traditional finance model seems secure for Mittelstand firms as far into the
future as one can reasonably predict.
In contrast, the German model of large firm finance has undergone more
extensive change in the last two decades and will likely do so in the near future
as well.  Large firms have attained a relatively high level of financial
independence from domestic banks.  They achieved this through growing rates
of self-finance and increased competition among domestic banks for large firm
business, while foreign banks and capital markets added new potential sources
of finance.  With this greater independence the relationship between large
banks and firms has become more arms-length, as firms search for the
cheapest source of capital.  As the European and global capital markets
continue their integration, this general line of development will continue.  This
does not mean, however, that large firm-large bank relations in Germany have
moved wholly to the Anglo-Saxon model. While large German firms are placing
greater emphasis on finding the best financial deal - whatever the source - they
are still strongly interested in maintaining stable, long-term shareholdership.
They are achieving this largely by holding large blocks of shares in each other.
Large banks continue to play an important, but far from dominant, role in this
insider system of corporate control.  Again, while we can expect the future to
bring further expansion of the German and European securities markets and a
broadening of the number of shareholders in German firms, the pace of change
is likely to be far slower than one might have predicted at the beginning of the
1990s.  Thus, it seems very unlikely that large German firms will be subject in
the foreseeable future to the short-term investment horizons more typical of the
UK and US.
Given the shortcomings of the German financial model, notably in
promoting new firms and sectors, is it still a desirable model to imitate?  To
what extent is institutional imitation possible?  Obviously, it would be desirable
to combine the advantages of long-term financing of the German model with
the dynamism and risk-taking of the Anglo-Saxon model.  The Germans are21
indeed trying to achieve this.  Yet such a blending is extremely difficult to
realize, given that the two systems rest on different logics - one essentially tries
to minimize risk through collateralization of debt, long-term relationships, and
modest state sharing of risks; the other tries to minimize investor/lender risk
through portfolio diversification and quick entry/exit from relationships.
But difficult does not mean impossible.  Some institutional features of the
German model could improve the function of other financial markets and may
be readily transferable, given the political will.  For example, state credit banks
which channel long-term funds to firms could make a considerable impact in
other countries. This would not necessarily need to involve government
subsidies (at least direct subsidies), since state banks can use their own high
credit rating to borrow long-term funds at the lowest possible rates.  These
funds can then be used to lower capital costs for firms (especially small and
medium size enterprises).  The use of a house bank procedure would also
ensure a central role of the banking system in allocating credit and that state
banks do not compete with private banks.
On the whole, however, transferring the German financial model, especially
the system of long term finance, would be very difficult since it rests on a wide
range of institutions, policies, regulations and practices:  The banking system
must have access to long-term savings, savers must have incentives to save
long-term, banking regulation must support long-term lending, and interest rate
stability must be high (see also Vitols 1995a).  Transferring only some elements
of the model is likely to bring partial success at best and, if not done well, may
actually introduce financial market inefficiencies.  Even so, the German
financial model still has strengths worthy of emulation.  Given that the German
financial model is itself a moving target, however, any attempts at institutional
transfer should be done with great caution.22
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